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- LYING
A Minor Inquiry into the Ethics of Neurotic and
Pyschopathic Behavior
Ben Karpman
In this study, the author, Chief Psychiatrist in St. Elizabeth's Hospital, discusses
lying as a particular form of human behavior, its relation to honesty, and its
general position in our present culture, which apparently makes lying an integral
part of our life. The general thesis is that lying is not a willful, consciously orig-
inated form of behavior, but is a product of repression and is unconsciously moti-
'vated. He then considers lying as it bears on the professions of law and medicine,
showing points in common and points in difference. The study is completed by the
consideration of the various psychopathological aspects of lying.
By special arrangement, this study is published simultaneously in the current num-
ber of New York Psychiattio Quarterly. Although entirely independent, it is in fact
an introduction to another study "From the Autobiography of a Liar" also to
appear in a subsequent number of the New Yorrk l'sychiatric QuarerlyyEmToR.
--
The quest for the true, the good, and the beautiful has from
time immemorial provided the strongest incentives in the life
of mankind. Different cultures, different epochs have placed
varied emphases on these which explain different standards;
as for instance, Greek culture, which stressed aesthetics, and
the Oriental culture, which regards honor as more important
than honesty. Our own modern culture emphasizes more
strongly the good vs. the evil, rather than knowledge vs. ig-
norance and the beautiful vs. the ugly. The good is our cultural
imperative and is the backbone of the socio-economic, political
and legal systems. The sole test of sanity vs. insanity is today
not in terms of superior or inferior intelligence, but in terms
of knowing the difference between right and wrong, essentially
a contrast in values, Quite universally, all religions, be they
monotheistic like Judaeo-Christian systems, the Buddhist-
Shinto system, the polytheistic religions, and many others, are
all oriented in one direction, that of goodness. The Bible speaks
with condemnation of wicked lips and lying tongues. Guilt
would not have played such a tremendous role in our life but
for the fact that man, the perfectionist, falls short of the ideal
of goodness and virtue that has been set for him. Throughout,
honesty, goodness and virtue are presented to us as the sum-
mum bonum humanitatis, as well as the best means for survival,
while lying, in its many varieties and types, is represented as
most reprehensible, and the core of all human vices. In philoso-
phy, ethics occupies a more important position than either
epistemology or aesthetics. Whether man is inherently good
(Bishop Berkeley) or acquires the knowledge of it through
experience (Locke), is still a favorite topic for discussion at
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philosophical tables. Social movements base their incentives on
social values and virtues, however they may clothe them with
knowledge and reason.
How thoroughly the idea of ethics has permeated our life is
seen in the fact that quite universally criminals try to find
justifications, however gossamer, for their behavior, which
they recognize as anti-social though it is true that their attitude
toward truth is only too often verbal and that they pay only lip
service to guilt. And what, after all, is a lie but an attempt on
the part of an individual to appear in a more favorable light
to make him seem more honest or better than he actually is, thus
again making basic honesty and goodness the chief criterion
in his life?
-2--
Withal, lying permeates our daily life, personal and social;
however it may be disguised by the thin veneer of social con-
vention. How many people are honest with themselves, let
alone with others? The use of cosmetic articles by women,
regarded but a few centuries ago as a crime, because used for
the purpose of deceiving man, is now an accepted mode of be-
havior; a woman feels that she is exhibitionistic if she does not
use rouge or lipstick whereas, in point of fact, it is the very
opposite. We all try to put our best foot forward, win friends
and influence people, and are not too careful about the means
employed. One shudders to think what sort of life ours would
be if every one of us were completely and entirely truthful. In
our daily pastimes, such as card games, we attempt to deceive
our partners into wrong playing by "poker" face or otherwise
making misleading moves. Can one picture what sort of inter-
personal relationship would be established if Mrs. Jones told
Mrs. Brown just exactly what she thinks of her, and Mrs.
Brown returned the compliment? How many automobiles could
a salesman sell if he told the prospective buyer all the mechan-
ical faults of his automobile while at the same time admitting
the undoubted superiorities of his competitors' products? How
many lawyers in defending a particular client are willing to tell
the judge and jury the unvarnished truth as they actually know
it, or fail to exaggerate the beneficial aspects of the case, ap-
pealing for the most part to the emotions of the jury rather
than to reason? How many district attorneys, set to win a case
and secure a conviction, do not equally go the limit in order to
create prejudices in the minds of the jury? Our huge advertis-
ing system is based on deceptions and gross misrepresentations,
as is also propaganda of various sorts, not excepting the power-
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ful pressure groups. and lobbies where all efforts are insincere
attempts to cover up selfish interests. What would be his
chances for re-election if every political aspirant were to tell
his constituents, openly and frankly, his undoubted limitations,
moral and ethical? When the late President Harding was being
nominated for the office by the Republican party and was asked
the usual question: "Do you know of anything that would dis-
qualify you for the office? '-his answer was in the negative.
Yet his life history shows him to have carried on a clandestine
affair, the discovery of which later so shocked the moral sensi-
bilities of the American people that had it been known at that
time it would have certainly disqualified him from the office.
Grafting and bribery are an almost acceptable part of our
municipal, state and other governments, and go on daily under
our very nose to- the passive acquiescence of the citizenry, which
now and then is shocked out of its complacency by such public
scandals as the Fall Teapot Dome, the Garsson Brothers, May
munition exposure, and the like. On such occasions a great and
spectacular trial is held, punitive sentences are meted out; the
public conscience is appeased but the matter soon quiets down,
and the merry business goes on again. It is almost an accepted
tradition in our political life that there is no sense in running
for office unless one takes advantage of the opportunity to make
a little extra money on the side. The late Boss Murphy, little
appreciating the low character of politicians' ethics, neatly
divided illicit income into honest graft and dirty money.
In his "The Conventional Lies of Civilization", Max Nordau
tells us of some of the wholesale lying and cheating that goes
on in our social life; there is enough material accumulated by*
this time to enlarge the scope of his volume to many times its
size and still leave much untold. International relations, from
diplomacy down (and up) are filled with misrepresentations,
evasions, and deceptions of the greatest kind. The League of
Nations fell apart not because of external difficulties but be-
cause of internal contradictions, because each member came
with his own bag of tricks and a pack of lies, each nation filled
with its own hostilities and impossible ambitions and a total
unwillingness to understand anyone else. The spectacle is being
repeated to date with the U.N. How else can it be with Soviet
Russia grabbing everything within her sight, by means mainly
foul rather than fair, disclaiming any responsibility for her overt
communistic activities but instead pleading that she is con-
stantly being discriminated against by others? What are we to
think of Britain, who votes with others for partition of Pales-
1949]
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tine, yet in the same breath manipulates behind the scenes, and
arms the Arabs against the Jews? Perfidy is too mild a name
for this. What shall one say of history of which it has been
stated that it is but a pack of lies agreed upon? Within the
memory of many of us is the character of propaganda that goes
on during a war; and some years later come the revealing
books; "Now it Can be Told"; the Memoirs of such and such
a statesman, etc. Propaganda not merely deceives, but whips
and drives people into action desired by power and pressure
groups.
Besides obvious forms of lying, there are many vicarious
forms of it expressed in deceptions, cheating, mental reserva-
tions, simulations, frauds and falsehoods of all sorts, moder-
ately tolerated by our society, until one passes to the grosser
forms that are legally criminal, but qualitatively indistinguish-
able from civil lying that commonly obtains in the interpersonal
relations.1 Truly it is no paradox that the greatest expression
of honesty is obtained among the insane.
-3-
Paradoxically enough, our mode of living not only allows for,
but actually creates many situations which make lying absolutely
necessary if people are to get along socially. The cultural im-
perative is to repress the basically true and to express the
socially desirable even if untrue. Our primitive urges, if un-
controlled and uninhibited, would not have allowed the formation
of a social order that would be self-sustaining. Our primitive
impulses unless socially conditioned, would not have allowed us
to get in contact with our fellow men. Our loves, if uncon-
strained, would interfere with the love trends of other people.
Our basic hostility, if uncontrolled or unmodified, would not have
allowed the survival of our opponents. Society has required
that man give up some of his primitive impulses if he is to de-
rive any benfit from social intercourse. Our whole system of
ethics and morals is built on that basis, and precisely because of
that we have to resort to a great deal of lying.
Politeness, no doubt, is a form of hypocrisy. What we would
like to tell the people we come in contact with, and what we
actually tell them, are two entirely different things. By the time
1 The number of synonyms for "truth" is small, but those relating to lying may
well fill several pages in the dictionary. To-wit: affectation, bluff, buffoonery, cant,
casuistry, canard, cheating, concealing, conniving, counterfeit, deception, dishonesty,
dissimulation, distortions, distrust, double cross, double face, double dealing, exag-
geration, faking, fallacy, fabrication, falsehood, feigning, fraud, humbug, hypocrisy,
impersonation, malingering, misrepresentation, perfidy, pretension, simulation, so-
phistry, tricking, understatement, untruthfulness, etc., etc.
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our original expression emerges to the surface, it has been al-
ready modified by our censorship. The social ethics required
lying. We do not tell a man his faults, even if we are painfully
aware of them, but we suppress our criticism and offer some-
thing that is benign. There is also a good reason for it in the
fact that unless we act that way toward our neighbors, they may
equally well not act that way toward us. Therefore, "Love thy
neighbor as thyself" may be not only a noble principle to follow,
but a healthy and practical one as well, for if we can manage
to approximate our love of our neighbor as our own, we have a
right to hope that he will do the same thing toward us, thus
giving us a better sense of security.
Pinocchio, it is related, would frequently tell lies and every
time he told a lie his nose would grow bigger until it got so big
it began to curl upon itself and develop many branches on itself.
There was but one way in which to get his nose back into normal
shape, and that was to stop lying, which he did, and happy he
was indeed. But having done away with lying, he began to play
hookey from school, whereupon his ears began to grow longer.
That was very uncomfortable and annoying as well for it gave
conspicuous evidence of his bad behavior. There was but one
thing to do, to stop lying, playing hookey or tricks and then, and
then only, would he appear normal, the moral being that in order
to appear normal in the eyes of society, one must keep away
from lying and tricks.
At worst, or at best, lying comes out modified in the form of
mild insinuations which are a considerable compromise from the
original. Our humor and wit are sadistically colored.
Lying as such did not, of course, come into play until man
learned to express himself verbally. It need not be supposed,
however, that man began to lie that split second (or is it split
millenium?) when he turned from quadruped into biped. Lying
as a form of human expression has a long and colorful history.
Giorgiade develops the theme that "the lie, while of biological
origin, has taken on the characteristics of magic when it passed
through the mind of prehistoric man. Prehistoric man evolved
from the stage of visual and spatial images to that of inimical
and vocal expression; later he developed the capacity of abstrac-
tion from immediate reality and, through the medium of lan-
guage, to interiorize thought (imperceptible vocalization), thus
guarding self-interest actions from his fellow-man. After ac-
quiring language, the magical power of images was substituted
2 Giogiade, 0. Magic as the 0igin of Lying and the Gnsis of Thought. Psycho-
logical Abstracts, Vol. 15, 1941. Abstr. No. 948.
19491
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by verbal magic. For primitive man the reproducing of objects
through laryngo-oral images was equivalent to manipulation of
real objects. Verbal magic resulted from this illusion. This in
turn led to lying in order to escape from difficulties."
One might add here that lying goes beyond the pre-historic
man. Deception or deceptive acting (mute lying) is not unknown
in the animal world as in the well-known instance of death feign-
ing in opossum, protective coloration in birds, etc.
-4-
In his essay "The Decay of Lying", Oscar Wilde, the supreme
aesthete of all time, argued eloquently and brilliantly for the
beautiful against the true and spoke of lying as an art, an ex-
pression of superior imaginative power. "A story", he says,
"if too true is robbed of its reality and is thus entirely inartistic.
We must emphasize the poetical side, imagination and unattain-
able ideals." In substance his thesis is that the essence of lying
is exaggeration, a gift which if properly nurtured might grow
into something really great. It is opposed to accuracy, which is
fatal to imagination. We must cultivate the wit to exaggerate
and the genius for romance. Modern fiction, he believes, is com-
monplace because it is so close to reality. The cultured and fas-
cinating liar should be the leader of our society. The true
founder of social intercourse is the primitive man who invented
phantastic tales of victories that never took place. The aim of
the liar is simply to charm, to delight, to give pleasure. Lying
for the sake of the improvement of the young is the basis of
home education. "The only form of lying", continues Wilde,
"that is absolutely beyond reproach is lying for its own sake
and its highest development is lying in art. Those who do not
love beauty more than truth never know the inmost shrine of art.
In the lost art of lying, birds sing of beautiful and impossible
things, of things that are lovely and that never happened, of
things that are not and that should not be. The proper aim of
art is lying, the telling of beautiful untrue things. Art is not
necessarily realistic nor spiritual. All bad art comes from re-
turning to Life and Nature and elevating them into ideals. Art
must not surrender its imaginative medium. Art is independent
of time. Any century is a suitable subject for art except our
own. The only beautiful things are the things that do not con-
cern us."
We shall not argue with a genius whose writings are so beauti-
ful even if not true. It is clear, however, that Wilde views lying
in the exceptional rather than the accepted meaning of the term.
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In daily, normal life we are acquainted with many and different
forms of lying but we may distinguish chiefly two: The harmless,
innocent lying (the white lie) which is regarded as benign be-
cause it satisfies some personal need in the individual without
doing anyone any injury. It may even do another person good.
Quite universally, it is a defense against real or fancied in-
feriority. It is not encouraged socially, because it is feared that
the too frequent use of it may lead to the more malignant form.
The second form is the malignant type of lying, the purpose of
which is the deriving of some personal benefit at the expense of
someone else. This may range from relatively harmless and
minor forms to the extreme one where one's life may be threat-
ened. Such lying is not condoned for it threatens our security.
-5-
Mankind has been kinder to its liars and falsifiers than it has
been to its thinkers and truth seekers. In the well known saying
"Truth forever on the scaffold, wrong forever on the throne",
one gets an explicit expression of the situation. Witness the
glorification that we have accorded to dictators, to the Borgias
and Richelieus, the Hitlers and Mussolinis, and contrast this
with the attitude toward Socrates, Christ, the martyr-saints,
John Huse and Savonarola, John Brown and Ghandi, all lovers
of mankind, rare souls who were willing to make the ultimate
sacrifice for the courage of their convictions. Blood had to be
shed by rebellious minorities rising against the tyranny of a
foreign power to secure what is morally due them; the slaves
who rose in arms against their masters, the abolitionists who
years in advance saw the need of absolute freedom As a condition
of progress and had to make so many sacrifices to secure what
was their inalienable right against the entrenched wrong.
And yet one is tempted to make a plea for the liar and a de-
fense of him. Often enough he is no more responsible for his
lying than a neurotic in general is responsible for his symptoms,
for lying has all the earmarks of a neurotic symptom and, like
all neurotic symptoms, it does not appear and maintain itself in
isolation but is intimately tied up with many other symptoms.
Through an unwitting concatenation of circumstances in the
making of which he had no hand, the liar often finds himself in
situations which immediately threaten his security and from
which he finds himself unable to escape except by lying; it is as if
the environment in which he functions demands lying on his part
as a condition of survival. Inevitably, of course, one lie leads to
another and still other lies, and these in turn, lead to deceptions,
1949]
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falsifications and cheating of all sorts. Why another person in a
like situation would not resort to lying but would instead insist
on telling the whole truth depends entirely upon the background,
the nature of his repressions and the strength of his Super Ego.
The famous Sam Johnson when asked what he considered the
greatest virtues, answered: "Courage, for if one has courage
he can practice all other virtues". Physical courage (bravery)
is the ability to go on in face of danger and at the risk of one's
life and limb. The loss of life in war time, tragic as it may other-
wise be, carries with it the compensation of having sacrificed
oneself for a country, and the possibility of immortality, and this
provides a strong stimulus for action. Greater yet, however, is
moral courage, for it requires the ability and willingness to sac-
rifice much of what one has against the tide of popular opposi-
tion; with the possibility of much loss and little gain. Most peo-
ple, however, would rather lie out of a situation than courage-
ously face it.
There are two professions chiefly, law and medicine, with per-
haps the clerical between them, that are directly concerned
with the problem of lying. Law deals primarily with the rela-
tionship between the individual and the community, always with
predominant, if not exclusive, regard for the interests of the
community and but little for the needs of the individual. By
long, hard and, one might say, painful experience, society has
learned what is the best it can do to promote the growth and
maintain the welfare of the community, and it has crystallized
these experiences into law. Law, therefore, depends a great
deal on traditions and established precedents which through
generations have become so rigid and so structuralized as to
have lost the emotional significance which they undoubtedly
had originally; for, cold and objective as laws appear to us,
they were at the time of their origin intensely personal and
represented emotional problems which the group had to solve
if it was not to suffer damage from its individual members.
The original attitude of man toward other human beings is
not entirely one of positive social sentiments; there is a great
deal in him of the isolate, who wishes nothing better than to
escape contact with others. Sexual needs and perhaps his
basic feeling of insecurity drive him to seek the cooperation
of other human beings and this is responsible for what has
come to be known as social sentiment. To secure such coop-
eration, he must perforce curb his aggression and sacrifice
some of his personal desires. This he does not do readily or
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willingly and the community is obliged constantly to put re-
straints on its members if it is not to suffer from their aggres-
sion. Through the medium of family training, and later
through the influence of the school, the church and the com-
munity, the growing child develops a conscience and a sense of
guilt, a ready obedience to dictates of culture (duty), and a
willingness to sacrifice his personal needs for the larger in-
terests of the community. While this training succeeds in
most cases, its failure in others produces the anti-social and
criminal elements of society.
It is at this point that lying comes in as a problem in law.
In order that law may justly and properly evaluate the share
of responsibility of the individual in the instance of an offense;
in order that it may be sure that society will be protected and
not suffer damage-and, it quite universally gives society the
larger benefit of the doubt-the law must have all the facts of
the case, plain, unvarnished, unequivocal. It cannot afford,
therefore, to admit lies. So concerned is society about lying that,
not trusting the honesty and integrity of the defendant and
the witnesses, it makes them take an oath, which is binding and
the violation of which, being perjury, becomes a legal offense.
In contrast, medicine as a profession, and its practice by
the physician, is built entirely around the individual patient. To
relieve pain, to alleviate suffering, to offer surcease for dis-
tress and sorrow, to provide the greatest comfort possible-
this is the essential work of the physician. The ethics of the
profession therefore demand that the welfare of the patient
be its foremost and greatest consideration; indeed, the only
consideration. Accordingly, the physician will not regard
truth as an absolute goal and lying as an evil per se, but will
consider them only to the pxtent that they affect the individual
patient. He will give the neurotic patient a placebo, knowing
full well that it is a gross deception, but justifying himself by
the consideration that: (a) it will give the patient a much
needed rest and sleep-which is most important; (b) that if an
opiate, barbiturate or other sleeping medicine were given, it
might well lead, in susceptible individuals, to addiction-a med-
ical evil. If a patient has an incurable disease, and if he is of
the stoical type that can "take it," it may be well enough to
tell him the truth so that he can prepare himself accordingly.
But most people are not stoical and the knowledge of the truth,
by adding an emotional burden to the already existing physical
one, may only hasten the end of life. Is it worth while, then, to
sacrifice a patient for the -sake of an abstract truth? The
1949]
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physician is dedicated to prolonging life. In the physician-
patient relationship he will lie to the patient, assuring him that
there is still hope, and thus provide a moral force that can pro-
long life, even if only for a few hours. He will feed him with
large doses of narcotics if this will relieve agony and prolong
life; and, even as he is dying, he will put small pieces of ice
between his lips to relieve the distress of the last hours.
Thus in a large sense the viewpoints of the profession of
law and medicine are indeed opposite. The view of the law is
social and communal; its interest in the individual member of
society is secondary and remote. Built on hard and established
precedents, law finds it difficult to break traditions and pave
new ways. Law is conservative, not in a derogatory sense, but
certainly in the sense that it wishes to preserve what has long
been established and found socially useful. Medicine, on the
other hand, is entirely individualistic. It is not directly con-
cerned with social needs, even when it works socially, as in the
field of public health; even when it looks upon society as a sick
body, the attitude and the approach are essentially individual-
istic.
Situations, however, may arise where the interests of the
individual may well conflict with those of the law. John A. is
a citizen in the community known for his supreme honesty and
high integrity. He is asked to testify on some matter and is
sworn to tell all the truth he knows. He finds, however, that
if he were to do that, he would have to betray the earlier con-
fidence of his friend, William B., which his conscience will not
permit him to do. A conflict arises here between individual
and social ethics, not always satisfactorily solved. A like sit-
uation may arise if a physician or a priest is asked to divulge
the confidence given him professionally, and implicitly under-
stood to remain confidential. If the physician or the priest
be importuned to yield the information, many will consider
it a betrayal of faith and trust, and in the end the whole thing
may boomerang, if people, having lost faith, will cease giving
professional men confidential information.
Opposite though the viewpoints of the two professions may
be are they entirely irreconcilable? Can the twain ever meet
on common ground? That, though not immediately feasible,
would seem to be not impossible. To what extent medicine can
afford to sacrifice its personal contact with the individual
patient, is difficult to say. But this much is probably clear, that
law will have to take greater cognizance of the criminal as an
individual, perhaps think of the criminal as a patient to be
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treated rather than punished. The physician feels that society
has produced the criminal, who neither chose his parents nor
the environment in which he was brought up.
Another reaction to lying and viewed differently by the re-
spective professions of law and medicine, is the problem of guilt.
The law recognizes personal guilt and in case of such guilt
expects the individual to acknowledge it unequivocally. The law
further assumes that man is a frep and responsible agent and
that, being thus free and responsible, punishment will act as a
sure deterrent. The law, not being concerned with motives, is
therefore not interested in what may have been the motive
behind the individual's deed, which motive, if known, might
help us to understand the nature of the guilt in relation to it.
It is here that we observe a basic difference in the attitudes of
the two professions. Medicine, in treating an illness, does not
treat the symptoms, but the causes behind them; for it has long
recognized that, however alike symptoms may be on the sur-
face, they may well have widely different causations. To the
psychiatrist, the behavior and the reaction are what symptoms
are to the general medical man. He goes behind the particular
deed, and wishes to ascertain the motive for it, for he realizes
that a reaction itself is not important unless it be judged in the
light of the underlying motivations; that the same reaction
and the same behavior may have different motivations in dif-
ferent hidividuals, and therefore must be judged accordingly.
In, the study of this motivation, he may discover that the in-
dividual had particular personal reasons for indulging in
the behavior or deed which, although not according with the
accepted tenets of society, may nevertheless have been of
particular importance to the individual. He may feel justi-
fied in lying about the situation and in regarding himself as
innocent. May one add to the four freedoms, the freedom to
lie? I understand that in some cultures (Oriental) lying is
acceptable, honor being more important than honesty.
On the assumption thait man is a free, responsible agent, the
law feels justified in punishing, such punishment being presumed
to act as a deterrent. It is, however, a historical fact that, for
the most part, punishment has failed as a deterrent and pre-
cisely for the reason that law was not differential in its undet-
standing of the offense, nor did it attempt to understand the
motives behind the deed.
Thus, medicine, and psychiatry in particular, submits that
man is far from being a free agent; and in support of this has
brought forth weighty and abundant clinical material to demon-
1949)
BENJAMIN KABPMAN
strate that responsibility varies with the individual and with
the deed, and that in many instances while the individual may
be objectively guilty, there may have been a number of individ-
ual justifying factors which explain the situation. If the ulti-
mate goal of society is its improvement, and law is an agent
to promote it, obviously that goal must be achieved through
the improvement of the individuals who compose society, and
punishment is not always the direct method by which such im-
provement can be obtained. Indeed, there is much to point to
the possibility that punishment administered without regard to
the motivations behind the situation may do the very opposite
of what is intended; that is, instead of being a deterrent, it may
prove to be an incitement to further crimes. It is therefore
doubtful whether the rehabilitation of criminals, which is de-
sired by all, can really be achieved by the commonly accepted
means unless the law is also willing to recognize and employ
some of the newly discovered methods of science.
-7-
It would be a task to stagger a stout heart to attempt to
classify lies, for in a sense lying is implicit in behavior of man-
kind in general. The following is merely a cursory attempt
designed to cover the most general features:
1. Benign and Salutary forms of lying: a) Not to hurt the other party.
b) To make another person comfortable. c) "What people don't
know won't hurt them." d) "Where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly
to be wise." e) "Why should I destroy her illusions?" f) There is
also such a thing as a "love of lying." We often hear the expres-
sion, "He would rather lie than tell the truth." The person thus
referred to is generally regarded as a habitual liar, and it is gener-
ally believed that he takes a positive delight in lying for its own
sake. But is there actually such a type, and if so, what is the
motivating force in back of his deliberate falsification?
2. Hysterical-to attract attention, to make others feel sorry for him.
3. Defensive: a) To extricate one's self from a difficult situation. b)
To account for misused time; to cover up thefts. Denying thefts.
c) Fear of punishment-there is a form of lying which results
from cowardice-the denial of having done something, springing
from fear of embarrassing or punitive consequences. d) Feigning
or malingering. Simulation of" disease by deception for the pur-
pose of gaining certain personal advantages.
4. Compensatory: a) To impress people with one's importance. b) To
pretend for one's self greater achievements. c) To cover up feel-
ings of inferiority. d) To excel another liar's story. e) "Keep-
ing-up-with-the-Joneses" motive-the lies of social pretension.
This is generally "defensive and compensatory" but certainly not
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unconscious. Allied to this is the lying from shame---"I wouldn't
want her to know how poor we are," etc. This is "defensive" but
hardly "compensatory" and certainly not unconscious.
5. Malicious-To deceive for profit. There is the calculated, scheming
lying of the typical dramatic "villain"--Iago in Othello; Edmund
in King Lear; Uriah Heep in David Copperfield.
6. Gossiping-maliciously exaggerating thin rumors or inventing the
same for the purpose of hurting a specific person and deriving
personal satisfaction from such gossip. Aspersions and insinua-
tions belong to the same group. These are often motivated by
strong personal emotional reasons such as hostility and jealousy.
7. Implied lying. This is a form of lying which consists of merely main-
taining silence, of refraining from telling the truth rather than
the actual telling of an untruth. It is more correctly called dis-
sembling or dissimulation. A person may say, "I didn't tell you
about this before, but-" and then proceed to confess some past
action, the absence of your knowledge of which had led you to form
an entirely different impression of his behavior than that which
is now disclosed by his retarded admission of this or that repre-
hensible action.
8. Love intoxication type of lying-I all love relations, there is uni-
versally an "over-estimation of the sexual object." Nearly all love
poetry is lying, in the sense of idealistic exaggeration.
"I wonder who's kissing her now.
I wonder who's teaching her how.
I wonder who's looking into her eyes,
Breathing sighs, telling lies!"
9. Pathologic lying as observed in malingering retrospective falsifica-
tions, phantasy and delusional elaboration; perhaps amnesic states,
etc. -8-
Perhaps the most insidious, even dangerous, form of lying is
self-deception, and the greatest harm done here is to the indi-
vidual himself. It is far more prevalent than is ordinarily
supposed. In its milder forms it appears as "kidding oneself",
talking oneself into believing that he is better or more accom-
plished than he actually is. It isn't lack of insight, but unwilling-
ness to use it, in order to spare the ego from unnecessary hurt.
Further, we have the beguiling of one's self into beliefs which
he recognizes as false, yet holds on to in spite of this because
of their intense emotional appeal.
Some people, it seems, do not like their original selves but
want to believe that they are different. They often seek to
escape the consciousness of inferiority or defeat, and try to
talk themselves into believing that they are better than they
actually are. Sometimes they are successful to the point where
they actually convince themselves of their fancied superiority
or success and behave accordingly.
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An unwillingness to admit defeat in achieving a certain objec-
tive will lead some people to develop a "sour grapes" attitude
as a result of which they talk themselves into believing-that
they didn't want the thing to begin with or that it really wasn't
worth striving for. Little boys who are too shy to meet little
girls, will sometimes tell themselves that they really don't care
for them at all, that in fact they hate them, preferring their
books and studies, which even on the surface appears a pal-
pable lie, easily seen by others though not by the subject. In
adults this is strikingly evident in cases of refused love, where
the rejected suitor suddenly falls in love with somebody else
as if to prove to the first love that she was not at all important.
Where is the difference between an honest wish and a lie?
If one forgets, or tries to forget, that which it is unpleasant to
remember, is this wilful self-deception or a state of amnesia?
Some people will not allow themselves to discuss sex, as if the
subject did not exist. Is not this tacit lying?
Much has been said in psychoanalytic literature about repres-
sion. Repression may be successful or it may fail completely.
It may only partially be successful; the individual may des-
perately strive to drive the memory of an unpleasant situation
out of his mind, yet not succeed fully, the bitterness of the
memory returning ever so often to the surface. However un-
willing, he may be forced to face reality. But there is little doubt
that the man is trying to hide the true situation from himself;
that he is indulging in self-deception.
If one is willing to accept the idea of subconscious lying, he
may go further and find that there may even be unconscious
lying. Certainly rationalizations are deceptions, but deceptions
practiced at the unconscious level.
-9-
From the standpoint of psychopathology, lying may properly
be viewed as a memory disturbance. It is therefore desirable to
correlate it with and differentiate it from other and grosser
memory disturbances: Confabulations, Retrospective and other
memory falsifications, states of amnesia, and hypermnesia,
Pseudologia Phantastica, pathological lying, etc.
(a) Confabulations are the compensatory filling of memory
gaps created by the damaging influence of an active, chiefly
organic or toxic, psychosis. They are usually associated with
Korsakow's psychosis but are found in general paresis, sterile
dementias, and other psychotic states. Somewhere in his per-
sonality, though mainly in the unconscious, the individual
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appreciates that his memory has suffered damage; that isolated
events and sometimes even whole blocks of events have been
blotted out; whereupon he proceeds to fill the existing memory
lacunae by free invention. These fabrications and pseudo-
reminiscences, though occasionally becoming quite fixed, are
as a rule very fleeting and unstable, changing not only from
day to day but indeed from moment to moment, not to be re-
peated again but substituted by entirely different ones. Their
volatility is evidenced by the fact that these patients can be
guided, directed and re-directed by the observer into all sorts of
channels. Yet throughout it all, one discerns a common denomi-
nator, a desperate attempt to cover -up a most embarrassing
life aspect. Because these confabulations endow phantasy with
reality, yet have no perceptible connection with or basis in
the reality of any actual experience, they may be termed memory
hallucinations (Bleuler).
Not everyone who has this type of memory disturbance will
resort to confabulations. It is indulged in by certain types of
personalities too sensitive to face inferiority and who therefore
are forever on the alert to build and erect compensatory de-
fenses. The organic or toxic condition acts here merely as a
precipitating factor, bringing to the surface those inadequacies
and limitations which heretofore have been latent because the
patient, still being normal, was able to repress adequately and
prevent these from coming to the surface. With the onset of
the disease process, the personality becomes insecure, repres-
sions less effective, emotions more labile and mobile, with the
gradual emergence of the heretofore existing limitations into
the open and the consequent psychic need to dispose of them;
hence confabulations which assume the character chiefly of com-
pensatory reactions.
(b) Retrospective Falsifications: As if not satisfied with
pathological distortion of present reality by means of delusions
and hallucinations, the psychotic will often resort to- including
in the system events of the remote past, projecting his false
beliefs even as far back as earliest childhood. Let us take a
patient whose psychosis became overt at the age of 35. To the
best available information, and to all appearances, he seemed
entirely well at 30, 25, 20, etc. Yet by the time he came to our
attention at 35, he gave an elaborate account of abnormal events
going back to his childhood. Events are recalled that never
happened (paramnesia), and for that matter never could hap-
pen. Single happenings are suddenly given a strange and mys-
terious explanation. And if these statements are not accepted,
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the patient will cite in new material their support-an endless
procedure if one ever tries to get to the bottom of it.
In neuroses, this behavior finds its parallel counterpart in
phantasies of other than known parental origin, of being a
changeling, etc.
(c) In hysterical amnesia one often observes that a whole
set of events with a large but unpleasant emotional tone is
driven out of consciousness. In the global type of amnesia,
everything pertaining to the particular painful event (e.g. mur-
der) is excluded from the conscious horizon (Katathymic
Amnesia). To support this amnesia, the patient will either not
fill the void at all, claiming that he just cannot recall the event,
or else by means of delusions and hallucinations, support the
entirely delusional idea that the event never took place. The
actual event has been repressed and is kept repressed because
the conscious mind finds it too painful to face the actual situa-
tion. In psychoses, states of delirium are often followed by
amnesia, though the events themselves are not particularly
important.
The amnesias need not necessarily be complete nor fixed.
Ever so often the repressed event may appear on the surface,
only to disappear again. Amnestic material sometimes re-
appears in dreams. Amnesias are not to be confused with other
memory disturbances; disturbances in retention such as are
found in organic and toxic psychoses; memory weakness, which
may be genuine because structural, in organic psychoses, but
entirely functional, even psychogenic, in schizophrenias.
(d) As contrasted oppositely with amnesias, we have hyper-
mnesias in which certain events stand out or are recollected with
particular clearness and vividness both as regards their general
occurrence, as well as recollection of details ordinarily little
noticed. We find this observed in dreams, hypnosis, delirious
states, etc.
(e) Pseudologia Phantastica is (at the conscious level) a
seemingly purposeless prodigious compensatory falsification
that does not appear opportunistic or defensive but is rather
compulsive in character and is not accompanied by a pleasant
reaction. It stands by itself as a special trend in the personality
of the particular individual, though it may be tied up with other
abnormal mental states, to wit psychoses, and particularly
neuroses. There is first of all in pseudologia phantastica a
most pressing need to indulge in extravagant castle-building to
make up for a reality that appears to the patient to be too
prosaic. Undisturbed, these patients live in a dream world.
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Nevertheless, even with a prodigious and vivid utilization of
exuberant phantasy weaving, generated by unconscious forces,
the pseudologue is not entirely unaware of the fact that the
whole thing is a fabrication, pure and simple. This is not at
all true of confabulations, states of paramnesia and retrospec-
tive falsifications. Confronted by facts and events which con-
tradict their phantasy, the pseudologue will readily admit the
true situation. In the manner of the hysteric, of which he is but
a subtype, and who, though blind, yet may see when necessary,
the pseudologue is still in touch with reality. The pseudologue
may be regarded as the functional psychic parallel of the con-
fabulatant. He differs from the confabulant, whose memory gap
is organic, in that his basic memory is structurally intact but
memories are freely invented to satisfy pressing psychological
needs. Further, where confabulations are built on memory
defects, and paramnesias follow amnesia or other memory dis-
turbances, in pseudologia phantastica the free invention is in-
dulged in entirely to satisfy specific psychological needs.
In a sense, Pseudologia Phantastica may be viewed as verb-
ally expressed day dreams and, as in day dreams, the patients
half believe their own fanciful tales. Theirs is an unusually
rich imagination prodded into active expression by acutely felt
psychic needs. They recite socially exalted backgrounds which
provide glamour for which they seem to feel a strong need,
or will recite sad tales calculated to arouse great pity. It is an
expression of a particular type of neurosis, and a study of their
life history reveals the presence of other trends indicative of
neurotic make-up: marked egocentricity, high suggestability,
unreliability, a pathological need for self-assertion, a preco-
cious sex life (masturbation and perversive trends) and marked
emotional conflicts about these. How, for instance, is one to
interpret false accusations of incest by a girl against her father
and/or brother (Healy's Case No. 16) except as inverted wishes
on the same level with hysterical fancies of violations and rape?
They have little or no insight into true behavior, or into the
harm they may cause others. They are all glib talkers, really
artists at fabrication, and their recital gives a strong impression
of verisimilitude. Characteristically, as noted by Healy, they
show a remarkable aptitude of language. They are good con-
versationalists and are good at composition.
According to Healy8 Pseudologia Phantastica is a type of
delinquency and leads to false accusations and swindling, and
S Healy, W. 11. andl Healy, M. T. Patlwogica7 Lying, Acusations and Swindling.
Little, Brown & Co., 1915.
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is therefore important from the standpoint of forensic psy-
chiatry. Thus cases should be separated and differentiated from
purposeful lying that is within the limits of the normal. Such
false accusations as may be purposeful and indulged in because
of vindictiveness, grudge-formation, or as a means of getting
out of difficulties, or which disguise undesirable truths, are not,
according to Healy, related to Pseudologia Phantastica.
(f) Pathological Lying: From the group Pseudologia Phan-
tastica it is desirable to split off as a separate entity, patho-
logical lying. Unlike Pseudologia Phantastica, it is not
compensatory or wish fulfilling in character but entirely defen-
sive: (a) to cover undesirable facts and events that will not
stand well the light of day, (b) to protect or safeguard a difficult
situation, (c) to avenge a hurt, the individual going almost
recklessly to no end of lying in order to satisfy a hostile feeling.
Unlike Pseudologia Phantastica, it is of a more conscious, more
deliberate nature, although the need for resorting to it stems
from the deeper resources of the personality. The pathological
liar may also want to provide a nicer background in place of
one that is sordid, substitute a different event for one he would
prefer not to admit; but in contrast to the pseudologue this is
done in greater moderation and quite within the limits of reality.
It is probably identical with the term chronic prevaricator which
Healy regards as falling within the limits of the normal but
which, in our view, is definitely abnormal.
-10-
To the psychiatrist, lying is of particular importance, for he
meets it daily in his work, whether in its direct and unblushing
form or in the form of unwitting evasions or rationalizations.
How is he to deal with such material? Is he to accept the state-
ments of the patient at their face value or give them only limited
credence; and how is he to define this limited credence? What
is he to take and what is he to discard? Is he to keep on ques-
tioning the individual who is so obviously falsifying the truth
or inventing situations that never existed? This may be an
endless procedure, for in the case of an expert liar this can
only mean more lies heaped upon many previous ones.
As a rule, the truthfulness of the psychotics can be relied upon.
The praecox usually will not lie. Though he may appear to be
evasive, this is perchance caused by memory or association dis-
turbances. He may be telling what appears to be an untruth,
whereas in reality it is only a symbol which, if properly desym-
bolized, may well be the truth. He may be asked how he feels,
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and although he is obviously depressed or apathetic, he may
answer that he feels quite well. This, however, rather than being
an untruth, is more an expression of disharmony of mood, a
clinical symptom rather far removed from lying.
The manic in an elated stage, because of his volubility and
exuberance, may exaggerate or minimize the real truth of situ-
ations, but this could hardly be called a lie. The paranoiac may
give expression to many delusional ideas and retrospective falsi-
fications, but these have long passed the stage of conventional
truth distortion and have assumed entirely the aspect of delu-
sional psychotic elaborations.
It is with the neurotic and the psychopath that we are likely
to have most trouble in this respect. Unlike the psychotic, the
neurotic is in too close touch with reality and, while he may be
deeply absorbed in phantasy, he knows somewhere, even if it be
only from the corner of his eye or the fringe of consciousness,
how much of what he says is true and how much of it is false.
When he is put in a position of defense he will not hesitate to lie,
but most of it may well be benign lying, a defensive or compen-
satory feature of his neurosis. He may resort to more malignant
lying, however, when his behavior is motivated by hostility or
other antipathic emotions, in which case, swayed entirely by
these emotions, he is likely to lie in order to satisfy the hostility.
Malicious gossiping is perhaps a good instance of this. He may
be involved in numerous difficult situations from which he may
want to escape, in which case his lying may assume a definitely
psychopathic character.
But it is in the case of the psychopath that the psychiatrist
has the greatest difficulty with lying, and nowhere is it found
more frequently than in prisons. Securing information from an
imprisoned psychopath presents many difficulties; by and large
he has been in trouble all his life and there is much that he
would like to hide or defend and much that he would like to
escape. He wishes to escape the consequences of his deeds, in-
eluding punishment, not only because, like any human being, he
does not like restrictions of any nature, but because he is so
absolutely lacking in any sense of guilt that he does not con-
sider himself wrong; therefore, he feels fully justified in telling
all sorts of lies in order to escape the consequences of his past
behavior. It is a most difficult task to obtain any true informa-
tion of value in the case history of a psychopath. Even when
confronted with reliable corroborative information from other
sources, he will persist in his original statement and will attempt
to confound us with still more lies. Not only does he lie about
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the existing situation which has gotten him into difficulties, but
he is equally disposed to falsify his background in an attempt to
create a favorable impression on the examiner. Such falsifica-
tion may at times approach a Korsakow's.
Almost any inadequate and incompletely reacted to emotional
state may lead to lying, but foremost among such states are
feelings of inferiority, insecurity, unrequited love, hostility and,
most of all perhaps, that great ubiquitous plague of mankind,
guilt: especially unconscious guilt4. Guilt is probably the greatest
emotional scourge of mankind. From cradle to grave it is at
once creative and destructive, responsible alike for much in our
loves and hates, our lies and truths, for ruthless aggression and
most abject humility, for many murders and suicides, as well as
for much of the normal and distorted human behavior. It is as
much a cause of religion as it is behind atheism. Rather than a
sequence guilt, certainly unconscious guilt, it may have been the
prime force behind the origin of religion.
Yet since these same emotional states, including guilt, do not
in other individuals under like circumstances lead to lying, it
must be concluded that in back of lying stands the liar, a par-
ticular type of personality that cannot face or accept reality,
but must distort it to meet his special needs. In such person-
alities lying is motivated by specific psychological constellations,
unconscious in character; it satisfies specific emotional needs
which not only determine lying as an outlet, but likewise the
type and content of such lying. The circumstances under which
the individual lies; why one individual in the face of a difficult
situation will resort to lying while another under like circum-
stances will stubbornly tell the truth and brave any untoward
consequences, is again a matter of personalities. The intriguing
question thus presented is: truth versus lying and reality versus
phantasy. Of course, one is not necessarily a liar at all times.
Many individuals-perhaps most individuals-may indulge in
lying on some occasions while they are quite truthful on others.
Thus, every neurotic and every psychopath tells his own type
of lies, a type which fits in with his background and personality.
The lie that will fit one individual will not at all fit another and
therefore cannot be used by another individual. Before the lie
4 It is extremely suggestive that although the problem of guilt plays a large part
in neuroses and in the daily work of psychoanalysts, the literature on the subject is
very meager. To be sure, many articles make passing mention of the subject and
here and there one finds an article especially devoted to its discussion, but there are
no books taking up the subject as a whole. I know of only one recent publication,
namely Bergler's "The Battle of Conscience," that discusses the subject in an ade-
quate and competent manner. In Saul's book, "Emotional Maturity," there is a
nice and confidently written section on guilt.
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is verbally expressed, the individual has at his disposal several
other choices and the expression finally chosen is over-deter-
mined. In some cases it may well have undergone a transforma-
tion from the original, and the lie, therefore, may be a reaction
formation, that is, a reversal of the original trend. In other
words, free and uninhibited as lying may appear to be, it is
basically well controlled by psychic processes of which the indi-
vidual has no specific knowledge and over which he has no con-
trol. Because of these considerations, we must view lying as a
product of unconscious mentation; and the unconscious does not
lie. Hence, regardless of how clever the individual liar may be
he unwittingly and unconsciously reveals himself through his
lying. Like dreams and phantasies, to which they are closely
related, lies have a structure of their own and a careful analysis
of them should reveal clearly the man behind them.
If now the tenet be accepted that lies are products of repres-
sions and are unconsciously motivated, it will now have to be
granted that there is a most definite correlation between them
and the life of the individual. The more we let the individual
talk, the more likely he is to produce sufficient material which,
even though it be in the form of lying, will somewhere definitely
relate to the true situation. Indeed this is the very approach
used universally in psychoanalysis. However honest a patient
may be, he unwittingly indulges in all sorts of distortion which
later the treatment is able to correct. Therefore, a psychiatrist
oriented in a psychodynamic focus should have less difficulty in
interpreting the meaning of lies in the life of the individual than
the psychiatrist who works merely at the descriptive level. By
a careful analysis of the lies the dynamic psychiatrist should be
able to uncover much of the true situation and arrive at the
dynamics of the very lies to which the individual has resorted.
Summary
In our modern culture, honesty is considered as more impor-
tant in human relations than either knowledge or beauty. Ac-
cordingly, lying, in its many varieties and types, is regarded as
most reprehensible ind the core of all human vices.
Withal, however it may be disguised by the thin veneer of
social conventions, lying permeates our daily life, personal and
social. Be it in interpersonal relations, relations between the
sexes, professional, commercial, economic, political, national and
international relations, our life is filled with lies and deceptions;
and the line dividing this from antisocial and criminal reactions
is often a very thin one. Indeed, lying may be regarded as
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integral to honesty and essential to it as a necessary complement.
Our mode of living not only allows for, but actually creates
many situations, which make lying absolutely necessary if peo-
ple are to get along socially. Our cultural imperative is to repress
the basically true and to express the socially desirable even if
untrue; for our primitive urges, if uncontrolled and uninhibited,
would not have allowed the formation of a well functioning social
order. To-wit, politeness, which is so important in our inter-
personal relations, yet is undoubtedly a form related to lying.
Lying has a long and colorful human history going to the
belief in magic in the prehistoric man. It goes even beyond that
for deceptions are not unknown in the animal world (death feign-
ing in the opossum, protective coloration in birds, etc.).
Like other forms of human behavior, lying is not entirely con-
scious, or deliberate. In its more overt form, it has all the ear-
marks of a neurotic symptom, a part of the general neurotic
constellation. It is often resorted to as a defense against feelings
of insecurity and inferiority.
Lies are products of repression and are unconsciously moti-
vated. The consideration of lying as such is meaningless unless
one recognizes the motivation behind lying. Lies are differen-
tial; they are psychological reactions that are highly specific for
each individual.
The interests of the two professions, law and medicine, are in
a large measure contiguous, though the view points are often
opposite and this appears clearly in consideration of lying. Our
early training of the child has for its purpose the develop-
ment of a conscience and a sense of guilt, a ready obedience to
dictates of culture (duty). While this training succeeds in most
cases, it fails in others resulting in anti-social and criminal be-
havior. It is here that law steps in, in principle condemning lying
as inimical to the establishment of truth and demanding truth
and nothing but the truth. On the other hand, medicine con-
cerned primarily with the welfare of the individual patient, can-
not regard truth as an absolute goal and lying as an evil per se,
but only considers these to the extent they affect the individual
patient.
In yet another situation, law and medicine appear to conflict.
The law recognizes only the deed, not the motivation behind the
deed. It further recognizes personal guilt, free will and personal
responsibility, which it expects the individual to acknowledge
freely and unequivocally, exacting a punishment as a sure deter-
rent. Medicine, on the other hand, recognizes etiology develop-
ment and pathology behind the symptoms displayed. In doing
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so, the psychiatrist may uncover some deep-seated reasons be-
hind a man's lying, reasons which may have their full justifica-
tion in the light of the individual's life history, to be understood
rather than condemned. Nor can psychiatry view man entirely
as a free agent, fully responsible for his behavior.
In general terms, lies may be classified as benign and mali-
cious; hysterical, defensive, and compensatory; gossiping, im-
plied lying, lying in love relations, and pathologically. A most
insidious form of lying is self-deception which is most often sub-
conscious. Certain deceptions are practiced at the unconscious
level, e. g. rationalizations.
From the ,standpoint of psychopathology, lying may properly
be viewed as a memory disturbance and therefore has relation to
such reactions as confabulations, retrospective falsifications,
amnestic states, pseudologia phantastica and pathological lying.
To the psychiatrist, the consideration of lying is of importance
in the study and treatment of patients. Psychotics as a rule do
not lie. The praecox will not lie, however evasive he may be;
unwitting falsifications may occur because of memory and asso-
ciation disturbances. The manic individual may suppress the
truth or exaggerate the real situation depending upon the mental
stage. The retrospective falsifications of the paranoiac are as
unconscious as are confabulations and amnesias. Neurotics may
lie defensively or compensatorily or for reasons of hostility. But
it is the true psycopath that is the liar par excellence, because
his life is full of misdeeds and grosser anti-social and criminal
behavior against the discovery of which he protects himself by
lying. He often lies beyond the need of the situation and lying
sometimes assumes the character of psychological lying.
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